40. Influence of the Haytian Revolution.
41. Legislation of the Southern States.
42. Legislation of the Border States.
43. Legislation of the Eastern States.
44. First Debate in Congress, 1789.
45. Second Debate in Congress, 1790.
46. The Declaration of Powers, 1790.
47. The Act of 1794.
48. The Act of 1800.
49. The Act of 1803.
50. State of the Slave-Trade from 1789 to 1803.
51. The South Carolina Repeal of 1803.
52. The Louisiana Slave-Trade, 1803-1805.
53. Last Attempts at Taxation, 1805-1806.
54. Key-Note of the Period.
40. Influence of the Haytian Revolution.
The rôle which the great Negro Toussaint, called L'Ouverture, played in the history of the United States has seldom been fully appreciated. Representing the age of revolution in America, he rose to leadership through a bloody terror, which contrived a Negro "problem" for the Western Hemisphere, intensified and defined the anti-slavery movement, became one of the causes, and probably the prime one, which led Napoleon to sell Louisiana for a song, and finally, through the interworking of all these effects, rendered more certain the final prohibition of the slave-trade by the United States in 1807.
From the time of the reorganization of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society,
in 1787, anti-slavery sentiment became active. New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
Delaware, Maryland, and
[p. 71]
Virginia had strong organizations, and a national convention was held in 1794.
The terrible upheaval in the West Indies, beginning in 1791, furnished this
rising movement with an irresistible argument. A wave of horror and fear swept
over the South, which even the powerful slave-traders of Georgia did not dare
withstand; the Middle States saw their worst dreams realized, and the mercenary
trade interests of the East lost control of the New England conscience.
41. Legislation of the Southern States.
In a few years the growing sentiment had crystallized into legislation. The Southern States took immediate measures to close their ports, first against West India Negroes, finally against all slaves. Georgia, who had had legal slavery only from 1755, and had since passed no restrictive legislation, felt compelled in 1793 [246] to stop the entry of free Negroes, and in 1798 [247] to prohibit, under heavy penalties, the importation of all slaves. This provision was placed in the Constitution of the State, and, although miserably enforced, was never repealed.
South Carolina was the first Southern State in which the exigencies of a great
staple crop rendered the rapid consumption of slaves more profitable than their
proper maintenance. Alternating, therefore, between a plethora and a dearth
of Negroes, she prohibited the slave-trade only for short periods. In 1788 [248]
she had forbidden the trade for five years, and in 1792, [249] being peculiarly
exposed to the West Indian insurrection, she quickly found it "inexpedient"
to allow Negroes "from Africa, the West India Islands, or other place beyond
sea" to enter for two years. This act continued to be extended, although
[p. 72]
with lessening penalties, until 1803. [250] The home demand in view of the probable
stoppage of the trade in 1808, the speculative chances of the new Louisiana
Territory trade, and the large already existing illicit traffic combined in
that year to cause the passage of an act, December 17, reopening the African
slave-trade, although still carefully excluding "West India" Negroes.
[251] This action profoundly stirred the Union, aroused anti-slavery sentiment,
led to a concerted movement for a constitutional amendment, and, failing in
this, to an irresistible demand for a national prohibitory act at the earliest
constitutional moment.
North Carolina had repealed her prohibitory duty act in 1790, [252] but in 1794 she passed an "Act to prevent further importation and bringing of slaves," etc. [253] Even the body-servants of West India immigrants and, naturally, all free Negroes, were eventually prohibited. [254]
42. Legislation of the Border States.
The Border States, Virginia and Maryland, strengthened their non-importation
laws, Virginia freeing illegally imported Negroes, [255] and Maryland prohibiting
even the interstate trade. [256] The Middle States took action chiefly in the
final abolition of slavery within their borders, and the prevention of the fitting
out of slaving vessels in their ports. Delaware declared, in her Act of 1789,
that "it is inconsistent with that spirit of general liberty which pervades
the constitution of this state, that vessels should be fitted out, or equipped,
in any of the ports thereof, for the purpose of receiving and transporting the
natives of Africa to places where they are held in slavery," [257] and
forbade such a practice under penalty of £500 for each person so engaged.
The Pennsylvania
[p. 73]
Act of 1788 [258] had similar provisions, with a penalty of £1000; and
New Jersey followed with an act in 1798. [259]
43. Legislation of the Eastern States.
In the Eastern States, where slavery as an institution was already nearly defunct, action was aimed toward stopping the notorious participation of citizens in the slave-trade outside the State. The prime movers were the Rhode Island Quakers. Having early secured a law against the traffic in their own State, they turned their attention to others. Through their remonstrances Connecticut, in 1788, [260] prohibited participation in the trade by a fine of £500 on the vessel, £50 on each slave, and loss of insurance; this act was strengthened in 1792, [261] the year after the Haytian revolt. Massachusetts, after many fruitless attempts, finally took advantage of an unusually bold case of kidnapping, and passed a similar act in 1788. [262] "This," says Belknap, "was the utmost which could be done by our legislatures; we still have to regret the impossibility of making a law here, which shall restrain our citizens from carrying on this trade in foreign bottoms, and from committing the crimes which this act prohibits, in foreign countries, as it is said some of them have done since the enacting of these laws." [263]
Thus it is seen how, spurred by the tragedy in the West Indies, the United
States succeeded by State action in prohibiting the slave-trade from 1798 to
1803, in furthering the cause of abolition, and in preventing the fitting out
of slave-trade expeditions in United States ports. The country had good cause
to congratulate itself. The national government hastened to supplement State
action as far as possible, and the
[p. 74]
prophecies of the more sanguine Revolutionary fathers seemed about to be realized,
when the ill-considered act of South Carolina showed the weakness of the constitutional
compromise.
44. First Debate in Congress, 1789.
The attention of the national government was early directed to slavery and the trade by the rise, in the first Congress, of the question of taxing slaves imported. During the debate on the duty bill introduced by Clymer's committee, Parker of Virginia moved, May 13, 1789, to lay a tax of ten dollars per capita on slaves imported. He plainly stated that the tax was designed to check the trade, and that he was "sorry that the Constitution prevented Congress from prohibiting the importation altogether." The proposal was evidently unwelcome, and caused an extended debate. [264] Smith of South Carolina wanted to postpone a matter so "big with the most serious consequences to the State he represented." Roger Sherman of Connecticut "could not reconcile himself to the insertion of human beings as an article of duty, among goods, wares, and merchandise." Jackson of Georgia argued against any restriction, and thought such States as Virginia "ought to let their neighbors get supplied, before they imposed such a burden upon the importation." Tucker of South Carolina declared it "unfair to bring in such an important subject at a time when debate was almost precluded," and denied the right of Congress to "consider whether the importation of slaves is proper or not."
Mr. Parker was evidently somewhat abashed by this onslaught of friend and foe,
but he "had ventured to introduce the subject after full deliberation,
and did not like to withdraw it." He desired Congress, "if possible,"
to "wipe off the stigma under which America labored." This brought
Jackson of Georgia again to his feet. He believed, in spite of the "fashion
of the day," that the Negroes were better off as slaves than as freedmen,
and that, as the tax was partial, "it would be the most odious tax Congress
could impose." Such sentiments were a distinct advance in pro-slavery doctrine,
and called for a protest from Madison of Virginia. He thought the discussion
proper,
[p. 75]
denied the partiality of the tax, and declared that, according to the spirit
of the Constitution and his own desire, it was to be hoped "that, by expressing
a national disapprobation of this trade, we may destroy it, and save ourselves
from reproaches, and our posterity the imbecility ever attendant on a country
filled with slaves." Finally, to Burke of South Carolina, who thought "the
gentlemen were contending for nothing," Madison sharply rejoined, "If
we contend for nothing, the gentlemen who are opposed to us do not contend for
a great deal."
It now became clear that Congress had been whirled into a discussion of too delicate and lengthy a nature to allow its further prolongation. Compromising councils prevailed; and it was agreed that the present proposition should be withdrawn and a separate bill brought in. This bill was, however, at the next session dexterously postponed "until the next session of Congress." [265]
45. Second Debate in Congress, 1790.
It is doubtful if Congress of its own initiative would soon have resurrected
the matter, had not a new anti-slavery weapon appeared in the shape of urgent
petitions from abolition societies. The first petition, presented February 11,
1790, [266] was from the same interstate Yearly Meeting of Friends which had
formerly petitioned the Confederation Congress. [267] They urged Congress to
inquire "whether, notwithstanding such seeming impediments, it be not in
reality within your power to exercise justice and mercy, which, if adhered to,
we cannot doubt, must produce the abolition of the slave trade," etc. Another
Quaker petition from New York was also presented, [268] and both were about
to be referred, when Smith of South Carolina objected, and precipitated a sharp
debate. [269] This debate had a distinctly different tone from that of the preceding
one, and represents another step in pro-slavery doctrine. The key-note of these
utterances was struck by Stone of Maryland, who "feared that if Congress
[p. 76]
took any measures indicative of an intention to interfere with the kind of property
alluded to, it would sink it in value very considerably, and might be injurious
to a great number of the citizens, particularly in the Southern States. He thought
the subject was of general concern, and that the petitioners had no more right
to interfere with it than any other members of the community. It was an unfortunate
circumstance, that it was the disposition of religious sects to imagine they
understood the rights of human nature better than all the world besides."
In vain did men like Madison disclaim all thought of unconstitutional "interference," and express only a desire to see "If anything is within the Federal authority to restrain such violation of the rights of nations and of mankind, as is supposed to be practised in some parts of the United States." A storm of disapproval from Southern members met such sentiments. "The rights of the Southern States ought not to be threatened," said Burke of South Carolina. "Any extraordinary attention of Congress to this petition," averred Jackson of Georgia, would put slave property "in jeopardy," and "evince to the people a disposition towards a total emancipation." Smith and Tucker of South Carolina declared that the request asked for "unconstitutional" measures. Gerry of Massachusetts, Hartley of Pennsylvania, and Lawrence of New York rather mildly defended the petitioners; but after considerable further debate the matter was laid on the table.
The very next day, however, the laid ghost walked again in the shape of another
petition from the "Pennsylvania Society for promoting the Abolition of
Slavery," signed by its venerable president, Benjamin Franklin. This petition
asked Congress to "step to the very verge of the power vested in you for
discouraging every species of traffic in the persons of our fellow-men."
[270] Hartley of Pennsylvania called up the memorial of the preceding day, and
it was read a second time and a motion for commitment made. Plain words now
came from Tucker of South Carolina. "The petition," he said, "contained
[p. 77]
an unconstitutional request." The commitment would alarm the South. These
petitions were "mischievous" attempts to imbue the slaves with false
hopes. The South would not submit to a general emancipation without "civil
war." The commitment would "blow the trumpet of sedition in the Southern
States," echoed his colleague, Burke. The Pennsylvania men spoke just as
boldly. Scott declared the petition constitutional, and was sorry that the Constitution
did not interdict this "most abominable" traffic. "Perhaps, in
our Legislative capacity," he said, "we can go no further than to
impose a duty of ten dollars, but I do not know how far I might go if I was
one of the Judges of the United States, and those people were to come before
me and claim their emancipation; but I am sure I would go as far as I could."
Jackson of Georgia rejoined in true Southern spirit, boldly defending slavery
in the light of religion and history, and asking if it was "good policy
to bring forward a business at this moment likely to light up the flame of civil
discord; for the people of the Southern States will resist one tyranny as soon
as another. The other parts of the Continent may bear them down by force of
arms, but they will never suffer themselves to be divested of their property
without a struggle. The gentleman says, if he was a Federal Judge, he does not
know to what length he would go in emancipating these people; but I believe
his judgment would be of short duration in Georgia, perhaps even the existence
of such a Judge might be in danger." Baldwin, his New-England-born colleague,
urged moderation by reciting the difficulty with which the constitutional compromise
was reached, and declaring, "the moment we go to jostle on that ground,
I fear we shall feel it tremble under our feet." Lawrence of New York wanted
to commit the memorials, in order to see how far Congress might constitutionally
interfere. Smith of South Carolina, in a long speech, said that his constituents
entered the Union "from political, not from moral motives," and that
"we look upon this measure as an attack upon the palladium of the property
of our country." Page of Virginia, although a slave owner, urged commitment,
and Madison again maintained the appropriateness of the request, and suggested
that "regulations might be
[p. 78]
made in relation to the introduction of them [i. e., slaves] into the new States
to be formed out of the Western Territory." Even conservative Gerry of
Massachusetts declared, with regard to the whole trade, that the fact that "we
have a right to regulate this business, is as clear as that we have any rights
whatever."
Finally, by a vote of 43 to 11, the memorials were committed, the South Carolina and Georgia delegations, Bland and Coles of Virginia, Stone of Maryland, and Sylvester of New York voting in the negative. [271] A committee, consisting of Foster of New Hampshire, Huntington of Connecticut, Gerry of Massachusetts, Lawrence of New York, Sinnickson of New Jersey, Hartley of Pennsylvania, and Parker of Virginia, was charged with the matter, and reported Friday, March 5. The absence of Southern members on this committee compelled it to make this report a sort of official manifesto on the aims of Northern anti-slavery politics. As such, it was sure to meet with vehement opposition in the House, even though conservatively worded. Such proved to be the fact when the committee reported. The onslaught to "negative the whole report" was prolonged and bitter, the debate pro and con lasting several days. [272]
46. The Declaration of Powers, 1790.
The result is best seen by comparing the original report with the report of
the Committee of the Whole, adopted by a vote of 29 to 25 Monday, March 23,
1790: [273] -- Report of the Select Committee. Report of the Committee of the
Whole.
That, from the nature of the matters contained in these memorials, they were
induced to examine the powers vested in Congress, under the present Constitution,
relating to the Abolition of Slavery, and are clearly of opinion,
First. That the General Government is expressly restrained from prohibiting
the importation of such persons `as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit, until the year one thousand eight hundred and eight.' First.
That the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit, cannot be prohibited by Congress, prior to the
year one thousand eight hundred and eight.
[p. 79]
Secondly. That Congress, by a fair construction of the Constitution, are equally
restrained from interfering in the emancipation of slaves, who already are,
or who may, within the period mentioned, be imported into, or born within, any
of the said States.
Secondly. That Congress have no authority to interfere in the emancipation of
slaves, or in the treatment of them within any of the States; it remaining with
the several States alone to provide any regulation therein, which humanity and
true policy may require.
Thirdly. That Congress have no authority to interfere in the internal regulations
of particular States, relative to the instructions of slaves in the principles
of morality and religion; to their comfortable clothing, accommodations, and
subsistence; to the regulation of their marriages, and the prevention of the
violation of the rights thereof, or to the separation of children from their
parents; to a comfortable provision in cases of sickness, age, or infirmity;
or to the seizure, transportation, or sale of free negroes; but have the fullest
confidence in the wisdom and humanity of the Legislatures of the several States,
that they will revise their laws from time to time, when necessary, and promote
the objects mentioned in the memorials, and every other measure that may tend
to the happiness of slaves.
Fourthly. That, nevertheless, Congress have authority, if they shall think it
necessary, to lay at any time a tax or duty, not exceeding ten dollars for each
person of any description, the importation of whom shall be by any of the States
admitted as aforesaid.
Fifthly. That Congress have authority to interdict, [274] or (so far as it is
or may be carried on by citizens of the United States, for supplying foreigners)
to regulate [275] the African trade, and to make provision for the humane treatment
of slaves, in all cases while on their passage to the United States, or to foreign
ports, so far as respects the citizens of the United States.
Thirdly. That Congress have authority to restrain the citizens of the United
States from carrying on the African trade, for the purpose of supplying foreigners
with slaves, and of providing, by proper regulations, for the humane treatment,
during their passage, of slaves imported by the said citizens into the States
admitting such importation.
[p. 80]
Sixthly. That Congress have also authority to prohibit foreigners from fitting
out vessels in any port of the United States, for transporting persons from
Africa to any foreign port.
Fourthly. That Congress have authority to prohibit foreigners from fitting out
vessels in any port of the United States for transporting persons from Africa
to any foreign port.
Seventhly. That the memorialists be informed, that in all cases to which the
authority of Congress extends, they will exercise it for the humane objects
of the memorialists, so far as they can be promoted on the principles of justice,
humanity, and good policy.
47. The Act of 1794.
This declaration of the powers of the central government over the slave-trade bore early fruit in the second Congress, in the shape of a shower of petitions from abolition societies in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. [276] In some of these slavery was denounced as "an outrageous violation of one of the most essential rights of human nature," [277] and the slave-trade as a traffic "degrading to the rights of man" and "repugnant to reason." [278] Others declared the trade "injurious to the true commercial interest of a nation," [279] and asked Congress that, having taken up the matter, they do all in their power to limit the trade. Congress was, however, determined to avoid as long as possible so unpleasant a matter, and, save an angry attempt to censure a Quaker petitioner, [280] nothing was heard of the slave-trade until the third Congress.
Meantime, news came from the seas southeast of Carolina and Georgia which influenced
Congress more powerfully than humanitarian arguments had done. The wild revolt
of despised slaves, the rise of a noble black leader, and the birth of a new
[p. 81]
nation of Negro freemen frightened the pro-slavery advocates and armed the anti-slavery
agitation. As a result, a Quaker petition for a law against the transport traffic
in slaves was received without a murmur in 1794, [281] and on March 22 the first
national act against the slave-trade became a law. [282] It was designed "to
prohibit the carrying on the Slave Trade from the United States to any foreign
place or country," or the fitting out of slavers in the United States for
that country. The penalties for violation were forfeiture of the ship, a fine
of $1000 for each person engaged, and of $200 for each slave transported. If
the Quakers thought this a triumph of anti-slavery sentiment, they were quickly
undeceived. Congress might willingly restrain the country from feeding West
Indian turbulence, and yet be furious at a petition like that of 1797, [283]
calling attention to "the oppressed state of our brethren of the African
race" in this country, and to the interstate slave-trade. "Considering
the present extraordinary state of the West India Islands and of Europe,"
young John Rutledge insisted "that `sufficient for the day is the evil
thereof,' and that they ought to shut their door against any thing which had
a tendency to produce the like confusion in this country." After excited
debate and some investigation by a special committee, the petition was ordered,
in both Senate and House, to be withdrawn.
48. The Act of 1800.
In the next Congress, the sixth, another petition threw the House into paroxysms
of slavery debate. Waln of Pennsylvania presented the petition of certain free
colored men of Pennsylvania praying for a revision of the slavetrade laws and
of the fugitive-slave law, and for prospective emancipation. [284] Waln moved
the reference of this memorial to a committee already appointed on the revision
of the loosely drawn and poorly enforced Act of 1794. [285] Rutledge of South
[p. 82]
Carolina immediately arose. He opposed the motion, saying, that these petitions
were continually coming in and stirring up discord; that it was a good thing
the Negroes were in slavery; and that already "too much of this new-fangled
French philosophy of liberty and equality" had found its way among them.
Others defended the right of petition, and declared that none wished Congress
to exceed its powers. Brown of Rhode Island, a new figure in Congress, a man
of distinguished services and from a well-known family, boldly set forth the
commercial philosophy of his State. "We want money," said he, "we
want a navy; we ought therefore to use the means to obtain it. We ought to go
farther than has yet been proposed, and repeal the bills in question altogether,
for why should we see Great Britain getting all the slave trade to themselves;
why may not our country be enriched by that lucrative traffic? There would not
be a slave the more sold, but we should derive the benefits by importing from
Africa as well as that nation." Waln, in reply, contended that they should
look into "the slave trade, much of which was still carrying on from Rhode
Island, Boston and Pennsylvania." Hill of North Carolina called the House
back from this general discussion to the petition in question, and, while willing
to remedy any existing defect in the Act of 1794, hoped the petition would not
be received. Dana of Connecticut declared that the paper "contained nothing
but a farrago of the French metaphysics of liberty and equality;" and that
"it was likely to produce some of the dreadful scenes of St. Domingo."
The next day Rutledge again warned the House against even discussing the matter,
as "very serious, nay, dreadful effects, must be the inevitable consequence."
He held up the most lurid pictures of the fatuity of the French Convention in
listening to the overtures of the "three emissaries from St. Domingo,"
and thus yielding "one of the finest islands in the world" to "scenes
which had never been practised since the destruction of Carthage." "But,
sir," he continued, "we have lived to see these dreadful scenes. These
horrid effects have succeeded what was conceived once to be trifling. Most important
consequences may be the result, although gentlemen little apprehend it. But
we know the situation
[p. 83]
of things there, although they do not, and knowing we deprecate it. There have
been emissaries amongst us in the Southern States; they have begun their war
upon us; an actual organization has commenced; we have had them meeting in their
club rooms, and debating on that subject. . . . Sir, I do believe that persons
have been sent from France to feel the pulse of this country, to know whether
these [i. e., the Negroes] are the proper engines to make use of: these people
have been talked to; they have been tampered with, and this is going on."
Finally, after censuring certain parts of this Negro petition, Congress committed the part on the slave-trade to the committee already appointed. Meantime, the Senate sent down a bill to amend the Act of 1794, and the House took this bill under consideration. [286] Prolonged debate ensued. Brown of Rhode Island again made a most elaborate plea for throwing open the foreign slave-trade. Negroes, he said, bettered their condition by being enslaved, and thus it was morally wrong and commercially indefensible to impose "a heavy fine and imprisonment . . . for carrying on a trade so advantageous;" or, if the trade must be stopped, then equalize the matter and abolish slavery too. Nichols of Virginia thought that surely the gentlemen would not advise the importation of more Negroes; for while it "was a fact, to be sure," that they would thus improve their condition, "would it be policy so to do?" Bayard of Delaware said that "a more dishonorable item of revenue" than that derived from the slave-trade "could not be established." Rutledge opposed the new bill as defective and impracticable: the former act, he said, was enough; the States had stopped the trade, and in addition the United States had sought to placate philanthropists by stopping the use of our ships in the trade. "This was going very far indeed." New England first began the trade, and why not let them enjoy its profits now as well as the English? The trade could not be stopped.
The bill was eventually recommitted and reported again. [287]
[p. 84]
"On the question for its passing, a long and warm debate ensued,"
and several attempts to postpone it were made; it finally passed, however, only
Brown of Rhode Island, Dent of Maryland, Rutledge and Huger of South Carolina,
and Dickson of North Carolina voting against it, and 67 voting for it. [288]
This Act of May 10, 1800, [289] greatly strengthened the Act of 1794. The earlier
act had prohibited citizens from equipping slavers for the foreign trade; but
this went so far as to forbid them having any interest, direct or indirect,
in such voyages, or serving on board slave-ships in any capacity. Imprisonment
for two years was added to the former fine of $2000, and United States commissioned
ships were directed to capture such slavers as prizes. The slaves though forfeited
by the owner, were not to go to the captor; and the act omitted to say what
disposition should be made of them.
49. The Act of 1803.
The Haytian revolt, having been among the main causes of two laws, soon was
the direct instigation to a third. The frightened feeling in the South, when
freedmen from the West Indies began to arrive in various ports, may well be
imagined. On January 17, 1803, the town of Wilmington, North Carolina, hastily
memorialized Congress, stating the arrival of certain freed Negroes from Guadeloupe,
and apprehending "much danger to the peace and safety of the people of
the Southern States of the Union" from the "admission of persons of
that description into the United States." [290] The House committee which
considered this petition hastened to agree "That the system of policy stated
in the said memorial to exist, and to be now pursued in the French colonial
government, of the West Indies, is fraught with danger to the peace and safety
of the United States. That the fact stated to have occurred in the prosecution
of that system of policy, demands the prompt interference of the Government
of the United States, as well Legislative as Executive." [291] The result
was a bill providing for the forfeiture of any ship which should bring into
[p. 85]
States prohibiting the same "any negro, mulatto, or other person of color;"
the captain of the ship was also to be punished. After some opposition [292]
the bill became a law, February 28, 1803. [293]
50. State of the Slave-Trade from 1789 to 1803.
Meantime, in spite of the prohibitory State laws, the African slave-trade to the United States continued to flourish. It was notorious that New England traders carried on a large traffic. [294] Members stated on the floor of the House that "it was much to be regretted that the severe and pointed statute against the slave trade had been so little regarded. In defiance of its forbiddance and its penalties, it was well known that citizens and vessels of the United States were still engaged in that traffic. . . . In various parts of the nation, outfits were made for slave-voyages, without secrecy, shame, or apprehension. . . . Countenanced by their fellow-citizens at home, who were as ready to buy as they themselves were to collect and to bring to market, they approached our Southern harbors and inlets, and clandestinely disembarked the sooty offspring of the Eastern, upon the ill fated soil of the Western hemisphere. In this way, it had been computed that, during the last twelve months, twenty thousand enslaved negroes had been transported from Guinea, and, by smuggling, added to the plantation stock of Georgia and South Carolina. So little respect seems to have been paid to the existing prohibitory statute, that it may almost be considered as disregarded by common consent." [295]
These voyages were generally made under the flag of a foreign nation, and often
the vessel was sold in a foreign port to escape confiscation. South Carolina's
own Congressman confessed that although the State had prohibited the trade since
1788, she "was unable to enforce" her laws. "With navigable rivers
running into the heart of it," said he, "it was impossible,
[p. 86]
with our means, to prevent our Eastern brethren, who, in some parts of the Union,
in defiance of the authority of the General Government, have been engaged in
this trade, from introducing them into the country. The law was completely evaded,
and, for the last year or two [1802-3], Africans were introduced into the country
in numbers little short, I believe, of what they would have been had the trade
been a legal one." [296] The same tale undoubtedly might have been told
of Georgia.
51. The South Carolina Repeal of 1803.
This vast and apparently irrepressible illicit traffic was one of three causes which led South Carolina, December 17, 1803, to throw aside all pretence and legalize her growing slave-trade; the other two causes were the growing certainty of total prohibition of the traffic in 1808, and the recent purchase of Louisiana by the United States, with its vast prospective demand for slave labor. Such a combination of advantages, which meant fortunes to planters and Charleston slave-merchants, could not longer be withheld from them; the prohibition was repealed, and the United States became again, for the first time in at least five years, a legal slave mart. This action shocked the nation, frightening Southern States with visions of an influx of untrained barbarians and servile insurrections, and arousing and intensifying the anti-slavery feeling of the North, which had long since come to think of the trade, so far as legal enactment went, as a thing of the past.
Scarcely a month after this repeal, Bard of Pennsylvania solemnly addressed
Congress on the matter. "For many reasons," said he, "this House
must have been justly surprised by a recent measure of one of the Southern States.
The impressions, however, which that measure gave my mind, were deep and painful.
Had I been informed that some formidable foreign Power had invaded our country,
I would not, I ought not, be more alarmed than on hearing that South Carolina
had repealed her law prohibiting the importation of slaves. . . . Our hands
are tied, and we are obliged to stand confounded, while we see the flood-gate
opened, and pouring incalculable miseries
[p. 87]
into our country." [297] He then moved, as the utmost legal measure, a
tax of ten dollars per head on slaves imported.
Debate on this proposition did not occur until February 14, when Lowndes explained the circumstances of the repeal, and a long controversy took place. [298] Those in favor of the tax argued that the trade was wrong, and that the tax would serve as some slight check; the tax was not inequitable, for if a State did not wish to bear it she had only to prohibit the trade; the tax would add to the revenue, and be at the same time a moral protest against an unjust and dangerous traffic. Against this it was argued that if the tax furnished a revenue it would defeat its own object, and make prohibition more difficult in 1808; it was inequitable, because it was aimed against one State, and would fall exclusively on agriculture; it would give national sanction to the trade; it would look "like an attempt in the General Government to correct a State for the undisputed exercise of its constitutional powers;" the revenue would be inconsiderable, and the United States had nothing to do with the moral principle; while a prohibitory tax would be defensible, a small tax like this would be useless as a protection and criminal as a revenue measure.
The whole debate hinged on the expediency of the measure, few defending South Carolina's action. [299] Finally, a bill was ordered to be brought in, which was done on the 17th. [300] Another long debate took place, covering substantially the same ground. It was several times hinted that if the matter were dropped South Carolina might again prohibit the trade. This, and the vehement opposition, at last resulted in the postponement of the bill, and it was not heard from again during the session.
52. The Louisiana Slave-Trade, 1803-1805.
About this time
[p. 88]
the cession of Louisiana brought before Congress the question of the status
of slavery and the slave-trade in the Territories. Twice or thrice before had
the subject called for attention. The first time was in the Congress of the
Confederation, when, by the Ordinance of 1787, [301] both slavery and the slave-trade
were excluded from the Northwest Territory. In 1790 Congress had accepted the
cession of North Carolina back lands on the express condition that slavery there
be undisturbed. [302] Nothing had been said as to slavery in the South Carolina
cession (1787), [303] but it was tacitly understood that the provision of the
Northwest Ordinance would not be applied. In 1798 the bill introduced for the
cession of Mississippi contained a specific declaration that the anti-slavery
clause of 1787 should not be included. [304] The bill passed the Senate, but
caused long and excited debate in the House. [305] It was argued, on the one
hand, that the case in Mississippi was different from that in the Northwest
Territory, because slavery was a legal institution in all the surrounding country,
and to prohibit the institution was virtually to prohibit the settling of the
country. On the other hand, Gallatin declared that if this amendment should
not obtain, "he knew not how slaves could be prevented from being introduced
by way of New Orleans, by persons who are not citizens of the United States."
It was moved to strike out the excepting clause; but the motion received only
twelve votes, -- an apparent indication that Congress either did not appreciate
the great precedent it was establishing, or was reprehensibly careless. Harper
of South Carolina then succeeded in building up the Charleston slave-trade interest
by a section forbidding the slave traffic from "without the limits of the
United States." Thatcher moved to strike out the last clause of this amendment,
and thus to prohibit the interstate trade, but he failed to get a second. [306]
Thus the act passed, punishing the introduction of
[p. 89]
slaves from without the country by a fine of $300 for each slave, and freeing
the slave. [307]
In 1804 President Jefferson communicated papers to Congress on the status of slavery and the slave-trade in Louisiana. [308] The Spanish had allowed the traffic by edict in 1793, France had not stopped it, and Governor Claiborne had refrained from interference. A bill erecting a territorial government was already pending. [309] The Northern "District of Louisiana" was placed under the jurisdiction of Indiana Territory, and was made subject to the provisions of the Ordinance of 1787. Various attempts were made to amend the part of the bill referring to the Southern Territory: first, so as completely to prohibit the slave-trade; [310] then to compel the emancipation at a certain age of all those imported; [311] next, to confine all importation to that from the States; [312] and, finally, to limit it further to slaves imported before South Carolina opened her ports. [313] The last two amendments prevailed, and the final act also extended to the Territory the Acts of 1794 and 1803. Only slaves imported before May 1, 1798, could be introduced, and those must be slaves of actual settlers. [314] All slaves illegally imported were freed.
This stringent act was limited to one year. The next year, in accordance with
the urgent petition of the inhabitants, a bill was introduced against these
restrictions. [315] By dexterous wording, this bill, which became a law March
2, 1805, [316] swept away
[p. 90]
all restrictions upon the slave-trade except that relating to foreign ports,
and left even this provision so ambiguous that, later, by judicial interpretation
of the law, [317] the foreign slave-trade was allowed, at least for a time.
Such a stream of slaves now poured into the new Territory that the following
year a committee on the matter was appointed by the House. [318] The committee
reported that they "are in possession of the fact, that African slaves,
lately imported into Charleston, have been thence conveyed into the territory
of Orleans, and, in their opinion, this practice will be continued to a very
great extent, while there is no law to prevent it." [319] The House ordered
a bill checking this to be prepared; and such a bill was reported, but was soon
dropped. [320] Importations into South Carolina during this time reached enormous
proportions. Senator Smith of that State declared from official returns that,
between 1803 and 1807, 39,075 Negroes were imported into Charleston, most of
whom went to the Territories. [321]
[p. 91]
53. Last Attempts at Taxation, 1805-1806.
So alarming did the trade become that North Carolina passed a resolution in
December, 1804, [322] proposing that the States give Congress power to prohibit
the trade. Massachusetts, [323] Vermont, [324] New Hampshire, [325] and Maryland
[326] responded; and a joint resolution was introduced in the House, proposing
as an amendment to the Constitution "That the Congress of the United States
shall have power to prevent the further importation of slaves into the United
States and the Territories thereof." [327] Nothing came of this effort;
but meantime the project of taxation was revived. A motion to this effect, made
in February, 1805, was referred to a Committee of the Whole, but was not discussed.
Early in the first session of the ninth Congress the motion of 1805 was renewed;
and although again postponed on the assurance that South Carolina was about
to stop the trade, [328] it finally came up for debate January 20, 1806. [329]
Then occurred a most stubborn legislative battle, which lasted during the whole
session. [330] Several amendments to the motion were first introduced,
[p. 92]
so as to make it apply to all immigrants, and again to all "persons of
color." As in the former debate, it was proposed to substitute a resolution
of censure on South Carolina. All these amendments were lost. A long debate
on the expediency of the measure followed, on the old grounds. Early of Georgia
dwelt especially on the double taxation it would impose on Georgia; others estimated
that a revenue of one hundred thousand dollars might be derived from the tax,
a sum sufficient to replace the tax on pepper and medicines. Angry charges and
counter-charges were made, -- e. g., that Georgia, though ashamed openly to
avow the trade, participated in it as well as South Carolina. "Some recriminations
ensued between several members, on the participation of the traders of some
of the New England States in carrying on the slave trade." Finally, January
22, by a vote of 90 to 25, a tax bill was ordered to be brought in. [331] One
was reported on the 27th. [332] Every sort of opposition was resorted to. On
the one hand, attempts were made to amend it so as to prohibit importation after
1807, and to prevent importation into the Territories; on the other hand, attempts
were made to recommit and postpone the measure. It finally got a third reading,
but was recommitted to a select committee, and disappeared until February 14.
[333] Being then amended so as to provide for the forfeiture of smuggled cargoes,
but saying nothing as to the disposition of the slaves, it was again relegated
to a committee, after a vote of 69 to 42 against postponement. [334] On March
4 it appeared again, and a motion to reject it was lost. Finally, in the midst
of the war scare and the question of non-importation of British goods, the bill
was apparently forgotten, and the last attempt to tax imported slaves ended,
like the others, in failure.
54. Key-Note of the Period.
One of the last acts of this period strikes again the key-note which sounded
throughout the whole of it. On February 20, 1806, after considerable opposition,
a bill to prohibit trade with San Domingo passed the Senate. [335] In
[p. 93]
the House it was charged by one side that the measure was dictated by France,
and by the other, that it originated in the fear of countenancing Negro insurrection.
The bill, however, became a law, and by continuations remained on the statute-books
until 1809. Even at that distance the nightmare of the Haytian insurrection
continued to haunt the South, and a proposal to reopen trade with the island
caused wild John Randolph to point out the "dreadful evil" of a "direct
trade betwixt the town of Charleston and the ports of the island of St. Domingo."
[336]
Of the twenty years from 1787 to 1807 it can only be said that they were, on the whole, a period of disappointment so far as the suppression of the slave-trade was concerned. Fear, interest, and philanthropy united for a time in an effort which bade fair to suppress the trade; then the real weakness of the constitutional compromise appeared, and the interests of the few overcame the fears and the humanity of the many.
Notes
[p. nts]
Note from page 71: 246 Prince, Digest of the Laws of Georgia, p. 786; Marbury and Crawford, Digest of the Laws of Georgia, pp. 440, 442. The exact text of this act appears not to be extant. Section I. is stated to have been "re-enacted by the constitution." Possibly this act prohibited slaves also, although this is not certain. Georgia passed several regulative acts between 1755 and 1793. Cf. Renne, Colonial Acts of Georgia, pp. 73-4, 164, note.
Note from page 71: 247 Marbury and Crawford, Digest, p. 30, § 11. The clause was penned by Peter J. Carnes of Jefferson. Cf. W. B. Stevens, History of Georgia (1847), II. 501.
Note from page 71: 248 Grimké, Public Laws, p. 466.
Note from page 71: 249 Cooper and McCord, Statutes, VII. 431.
Note from page 72: 250 Cooper and McCord, Statutes, VII. 433-6, 444, 447.
Note from page 72: 251 Ibid., VII. 449.
Note from page 72: 252 Martin, Iredell's Acts of Assembly, I. 492.
Note from page 72: 253 Ibid., II. 53.
Note from page 72: 254 Cf. Ibid., II. 94; Laws of North Carolina (revision of 1819), I. 786.
Note from page 72: 255 Virginia codified her whole slave legislation in 1792 (Va. Statutes at Large, New Ser., I. 122), and amended her laws in 1798 and 1806 (Ibid., III. 251).
Note from page 72: 256 Dorsey, Laws of Maryland, 1796, I. 334.
Note from page 72: 257 Laws of Delaware, 1797 (Newcastle ed.), p. 942, ch. 194 b.
Note from page 73: 258 Dallas, Laws, II. 586.
Note from page 73: 259 Paterson, Digest of the Laws of New Jersey (1800), pp. 307-13. In 1804 New Jersey passed an act gradually to abolish slavery. The legislation of New York at this period was confined to regulating the exportation of slave criminals (1790), and to passing an act gradually abolishing slavery (1799). In 1801 she codified all her acts.
Note from page 73: 260 Acts and Laws of Connecticut (ed. 1784), pp. 368, 369, 388.
Note from page 73: 261 Ibid., p. 412.
Note from page 73: 262 Perpetual Laws of Massachusetts, 1780-89, pp. 235-6.
Note from page 73: 263 Queries Respecting Slavery, etc., in Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll., 1st Ser., IV. 205.
Note from page 74: 264 Annals of Cong., 1 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 336-41.
Note from page 75: 265 Annals of Cong., 1 Cong. 1 sess. p. 903.
Note from page 75: 266 Ibid., 1 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1182-3.
Note from page 75: 267 Journals of Cong., 1782-3, pp. 418-9. Cf. above, p. 51.
Note from page 75: 268 Annals of Cong., 1 Cong. 2 sess. p. 1184.
Note from page 75: 269 Ibid., pp. 1182-91.
Note from page 76: 270 Annals of Cong., 1 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1197-1205.
Note from page 78: 271 House Journal (repr. 1826), 1 Cong. 2 sess. I. 157-8.
Note from page 78: 272 Annals of Cong., 1 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1413-7.
Note from page 78: 273 For the reports and debates, cf. Annals of Cong., 1 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1413-7, 1450-74; House Journal (repr. 1826), 1 Cong. 2 sess. I. 168-81.
Note from page : 274 A clerical error in the original: "interdict" and "regulate" should be interchanged.
Note from page : 275 A clerical error in the original: "interdict" and "regulate" should be interchanged.
Note from page : 276 See Memorials presented to Congress, etc. (1792), published by the Pennsylvania Abolition Society.
Note from page : 277 From the Virginia petition.
Note from page : 278 From the petition of Baltimore and other Maryland societies.
Note from page : 279 From the Providence Abolition Society's petition.
Note from page : 280 House Journal (repr. 1826), 2 Cong. 2 sess. I. 627-9; Annals of Cong., 2 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 728-31.
Note from page 81: 281 Annals of Cong., 3 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 64, 70, 72; House Journal (repr. 1826), 3 Cong. 1 sess. II. 76, 84-5, 96-100; Senate Journal (repr. 1820), 3 Cong. 1 sess. II. 51.
Note from page 81: 282 Statutes at Large, I. 347-9.
Note from page 81: 283 Annals of Cong., 5 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 656-70, 945-1033.
Note from page 81: 284 Annals of Cong., 6 Cong. 1 sess. p. 229.
Note from page 81: 285 Dec. 12, 1799: House Journal (repr. 1826), 6 Cong. 1 sess. III. 535. For the debate, see Annals of Cong., 6 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 230-45.
Note from page 83: 286 Senate Journal (repr. 1821), 6 Cong. 1 sess. III. 72, 77, 88, 92; see Ibid., Index, Bill No. 62; House Journal (repr. 1826), 6 Cong. 1 sess. III., Index, House Bill No. 247. For the debate, see Annals of Cong., 6 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 686-700.
Note from page 83: 287 Annals of Cong., 6 Cong. 1 sess. p. 697.
Note from page 84: 288 Annals of Cong., 6 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 699-700.
Note from page 84: 289 Statutes at Large, II. 70.
Note from page 84: 290 Annals of Cong., 7 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 385-6.
Note from page 84: 291 Ibid., p. 424.
Note from page 85: 292 See House Bills Nos. 89 and 101; Annals of Cong., 7 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 424, 459-67. For the debate, see Ibid., pp. 459-72.
Note from page 85: 293 Statutes at Large, II. 205.
Note from page 85: 294 Cf. Fowler, Local Law in Massachusetts and Connecticut, etc., p. 126.
Note from page 85: 295 Speech of S. L. Mitchell of New York, Feb. 14, 1804: Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1000. Cf. also speech of Bedinger: Ibid., pp. 997-8.
Note from page 86: 296 Speech of Lowndes in the House, Feb. 14, 1804: Annals of Cong., 8 Cong., 1 sess. p. 992. Cf. Stanton's speech later: Ibid., 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 240.
Note from page 87: 297 Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 820, 876.
Note from page 87: 298 Ibid., pp. 992-1036.
Note from page 87: 299 Huger of South Carolina declared that the whole South Carolina Congressional delegation opposed the repeal of the law, although they maintained the State's right to do so if she chose: Ibid., p. 1005.
Note from page 87: 300 Ibid., pp. 1020-36; House Journal (repr. 1826), 8 Cong. 1 sess. IV. 523, 578, 580, 581-5.
Note from page 88: 301 On slavery in the Territories, cf. Welling, in Report Amer. Hist. Assoc., 1891, pp. 133-60.
Note from page 88: 302 Statutes at Large, I. 108.
Note from page 88: 303 Journals of Cong., XII. 137-8.
Note from page 88: 304 Annals of Cong., 5 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 511, 515, 532-3.
Note from page 88: 305 Ibid., 5 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1235, 1249, 1277-84, 1296-1313.
Note from page 88: 306 Ibid., p. 1313.
Note from page 89: 307 Statutes at Large, I. 549.
Note from page 89: 308 Amer. State Papers, Miscellaneous, I. No. 177.
Note from page 89: 309 Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 106, 211, 223, 231, 233-4, 238.
Note from page 89: 310 Ibid., pp. 240, 1186.
Note from page 89: 311 Ibid., p. 241.
Note from page 89: 312 Ibid., p. 240.
Note from page 89: 313 Ibid., p. 242.
Note from page 89: 314 For further proceedings, see Ibid., pp. 240-55, 1038-79, 1128-9, 1185-9. For the law, see Statutes at Large, II. 283-9.
Note from page 89: 315 First, a bill was introduced applying the Northwest Ordinance to the Territory (Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 45-6); but this was replaced by a Senate bill (Ibid., p. 68; Senate Journal, repr. 1821, 8 Cong. 2 sess. III. 464). For the petition of the inhabitants, see Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 2 sess. p. 727-8.
Note from page 89: 316 The bill was hurried through, and there are no records of debate. Cf. Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 28-69, 727, 871, 957, 1016-20, 1213-5. In Senate Journal (repr. 1821), III., see Index, Bill No. 8. Importation of slaves was allowed by a clause erecting a Frame of Government "similar" to that of the Mississippi Territory.
Note from page 90: 317 Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 1 sess. p. 443. The whole trade was practically foreign, for the slavers merely entered the Negroes at Charleston and immediately reshipped them to New Orleans. Cf. Annals of Cong., 16 Cong. 1 sess. p. 264.
Note from page 90: 318 House Journal (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 1 sess. V. 264; Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 445, 878.
Note from page 90: 319 House Reports, 9 Cong. 1 sess. Feb. 17, 1806.
Note from page 90: 320 House Bill No. 123.
Note from page 90: 321 Annals of Cong., 16 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 73-7. This report
covers the time from Jan. 1, 1804, to Dec. 31, 1807. During that time the following
was the number of ships engaged in the traffic: --
From Charleston, 61
From Rhode Island, 59
From Baltimore, 4
From Boston, 1
From Norfolk, 2
From Connectiout, 1
From Sweden, 1
Great Britain, 70
From France, 3
202
The consignees of these slave ships were natives of
Charleston 13
Rhode Island 88
Great Britain 91
France 10
202
The following slaves were imported: --
By British vessels 19,949
By French vessels 1,078
21,027
By American vessels: --
By Charleston merchants 2,006
By Rhode Island merchants 7,958
By Foreign merchants 5,717
By other Northern merchants 930
By other Southern merchants 1,437 18,048
Total number of slaves imported, 1804-7 39,075
It is, of course, highly probable that the Custom House returns were much below the actual figures.
Note from page 91: 322 McMaster, History of the People of the United States, III. p. 517.
Note from page 91: 323 House Journal (repr. 1826), 8 Cong. 2 sess. V. 171; Mass. Resolves, May, 1802, to March, 1806, Vol. II. A. (State House ed., p. 239).
Note from page 91: 324 House Journal (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 1 sess. V. 238.
Note from page 91: 325 Ibid., V. 266.
Note from page 91: 326 Senate Journal (repr. 1821), 9 Cong. 1 sess. IV. 76, 77, 79.
Note from page 91: 327 House Journal (repr. 1826), 8 Cong. 2 sess. V. 171.
Note from page 91: 328 Annals of Cong., Cong. 1 sess. p. 274.
Note from page 91: 329 Ibid., pp. 272-4, 323.
Note from page 91: 330 Ibid., pp. 346-52, 358-75, etc., to 520.
Note from page 92: 331 Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 374-5.
Note from page 92: 332 See House Bill No. 94.
Note from page 92: 333 Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 1 sess. p. 466.
Note from page 92: 334 Ibid., pp. 519-20.
Note from page 92: 335 Ibid., pp. 21, 52, 75, etc., to 138, 485-515, 1228. See House Bill No. 168. Cf. Statutes at Large, II. 421-2.
Note from page 93: 336 A few months later, at the expiration of the period, trade was quietly reopened. Annals of Cong., 11 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 443-6.