Black VOTING ( Registration and Primaries )
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GUINN v. UNITED STATES
238 US 347 (1915)
( Justice White delivered the opinion)
By an amendment passed in 1910, the Constitution of Oklahoma restricted the franchise according to a "grandfather clause" which provided that no illiterate person could be registered to vote. The clause, however, granted an exemption for such a person provided he had lived in a foreign country prior to January 1, 1866; had been eligible to register prior to that date, or if his lineal ancestor was eligible to vote at that time. Since no blacks were eligible to vote in Oklahoma prior to 1866, the law disenfranchised all black.
The U.S. Supreme Court held the grandfather clause in invalid in Oklahoma, as well as in any other state where one was in effect.
NIXON v. HERNDON
286 US 536 (1927)
(Justice Cardozo delivered the opinion)
Pursuant to the decision in the above case, the Texas legislature passed a new statute, empowering the state Democratic executive committee to set up its own rules regarding the primary. The party promptly adopted a resolution stipulating that only white Democrats be allowed to participate in the primary. Dr. Nixon again filed suit, and his right to vote was again upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.
LANE v. WILSON
307 US 268 (1939)
(Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion.)
In an attempt to restrict voter registration, the Oklahoma legislature provided that all those who were already registered would remain qualified voters, but that all others would have to register within 12days (from April 30 to May 11, 1916), or be forever barred from the polls. In 1934 I. W. Lane, a black man was refused registration on the basis of this statute. The U.S. Supreme Court declared that the statute was in conflict with the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and, as such, was unconstitutional.
SMITH v. ALLWRIGHT
321 US 649 (1944)
The Texas State Democratic party, in convention, limited the right of membership to white electors, thereby denying non-whites the right to participate in a Democratic party primary. In Grovey v. Townsent (295 US 45), the Supreme Court had upheld this limitation as not being unconstitutional because the determination was made by the party in convention, not by a party executive committee as in Condon. Here the Supreme Court overruled Grovey, stating, "The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law grants to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected officials without restriction by any state because of race." The Court noted that the political party makes its selection of candidates as an agency of the state and, as such, could not exclude participation based on race and remain consistent with the Fifteenth Amendment.
BAKER v. CARR
369 US 186 (1962)
This case was brought by electors in several counties of the state of Tennessee who asserted that the 1901 legislative reapportionment statute was unconstitutional because the numbers of voters in the various districts had changed substantially since then, The plaintiffs requested that the court either direct a reapportionment by mathematical application of the Tennessee constitutional formula to the 1960 census of instruct the state to hold direct at-large elections. Th district court dismissed the case on the grounds that it was a political question and, as such, did not fall within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the case involved a basic constitutional right and thereby was within court jurisdiction and remanded the case to the district court.