The Statutes of the Slave States not only make no provision for a general Emancipation, but they obstruct and prevent Emancipations by the Master. And the Constitutions of some of the States forbid the Legislatures to abolish Slavery.

     WE have seen that slavery is hereditary and perpetual in the nature of its tenure, and that the code by which it is defined contemplates no period of its termination, and points out no conditions upon which the slave or his posterity can escape from it. (See Chap. XXI. of the former series.) One avenue of hope only remains for him. The slave master may himself emancipate. In very many instances, slave masters have done so. The hope has been thus inspired of such an increase of manumissions as should weaken and ultimately terminate the whole system.

     The hopes of humanity, in this direction, have not outrun the fears of the majority of slaveholders, who control the legislation of the slave States. The laws accordingly interpose obstacles to emancipation. The reasons urged at the South for legislative and

judicial restrictions upon emancipation cannot, perhaps, be more favorably or more forcibly stated than in the following extract from a note by Mr. Wheeler, at the close of his chapter of reported cases concerning “the emancipation of slaves:”

     “It will be seen by this chapter that the owner of slaves may emancipate them by deed, will, or contract executed. But to this BENEVOLENCE of the owner there are, in most of the States, RESTRAINTS upon the exercise of this power by the owner. Slaves are recognized, wherever this system is tolerated, as property, and are subject to all the rules in the acquisition, possession, and transmission of property. It would seem, therefore, upon a first view of the case, that the owner should do with his property whatever he pleased, and should have the privilege of renouncing his right to it whenever he pleased, and without being qualified by any public laws or regulations on the subject. Such, however, is not the fact; restraints upon this right exist in nearly all the States.”

     After citing some of the laws on the subject, including those of Tennessee and Alabama, which we shall copy, Mr. Wheeler proceeds:

     “When it is considered that slaves are a peculiar species of property, it will not excite surprise that laws are necessary for their regulation, and to protect society from even the benevolence of slave owners, in throwing upon the community a great number of stupid, ignorant, and vicious persons, to disturb its peace and endanger its permanency.

     “The right of society to regulate and control the

ownership and control of this kind of property may be justified on the same grounds as some other species of property. No one can doubt the right of individuals to acquire, possess, and sell gun powder. But if the possessor chooses to take it to his house or store, in a city or populous town, the public become interested, and will restrain him within reasonable and proper limits.”* “And the constitutionality of such laws cannot be doubted. So of slaves. The owner may keep as many as he pleases, but if he emancipates them, and turns them loose upon society, they have a right to protect themselves against his improvidence, or even against his benevolence and generosity. They have a right to declare the act illegal, or restrain it within such bounds as shall secure their safety.” (Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, pp. 386-8.)

     In Mr. Wheeler’s book we have met with no mention of the laws forbidding the education of slaves and free colored people, and their free access to the means of religious and moral instruction. By the side of such laws, the plea for laws restraining emancipation on the ground of the ignorance and vice of the colored people, would have seemed incongruous. It is the intelligence and virtue of the colored race

that constitute the “danger” to be guarded against in this feature of slave legislation and jurisprudence. And the honesty and conscientious misgivings of repenting slaveholders (quite as truly as their “benevolence and generosity”) constitute another danger against which a “society” of slaveholders thus protects itself.

     This principle of restriction obtains in the code of nearly every one of the slave States, though an express enactment cannot always be cited for it.

     In South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama, the Legislature only, by express enactments, have authority to emancipate slaves. (Vide authorities cited by Stroud, p.147.)

     In North Carolina, a slave cannot be emancipated except for meritorious services, to be adjudged and allowed of by the Court. (Haywood’s Manual, 537, Act of 1796.)

     A general principle, pervading the legislation and jurisprudence of the several States, is, that the owner may not emancipate without the consent of his creditors. Thus, “in Virginia and Mississippi, an emancipated slave may be taken in execution to satisfy any debt contracted by the person emancipating him, previous to such emancipation.” (1 Rev. Code of Virginia; 434. Mississippi Rev. Code, 386.)

     In Kentucky, the emancipating papers must contain a saving of the rights of creditors. (2 Litt. and Swi., 1155.)

     In Louisiana, any enfranchisement made in fraud of creditors is void.” (New Civil Code, art. 190.)

     In Virginia, Mississippi, and Kentucky, the widow of a deceased slaveholder, who may have emancipated a slave, may claim her “third” to which the widow is entitled. (1 Rev. Code of Virginia, 435. Mississippi Rev. Code, 386. 2 Litt. and Swi., 1246.) And when one third part of an emancipated slave is thus reënslaved, the problem of preserving the remaining two thirds of him in a state of freedom would perhaps puzzle his best legal advisers!

     In Georgia, “the attempt” to set free a slave, otherwise than by application to the Legislature, is punished as an “offense”—a fine of two hundred dollars, one half to the informer and the other half to the county; and the manumitted slave is retained in slavery. (Prince’s Digest, 457.) And, as if this were not sufficient, an additional Act, in 1818, declares that every last will and testament by which slaves shall be set free, or any such will or other “instrument in writing, or by parol,” by which slaves shall be allowed the privilege of working for themselves, “to be utterly null and void.” And the person executing such writing, or “attempting to give it effect,” or “accepting a trust” under it, may be fined “not exceeding one thousand dollars;” and every slave “on whose behalf” such instrument shall be written, “being thereof convicted, (?!) shall be sold at public outcry, and the proceeds appropriated,” &c. (Prince’s Digest, 466.)

     In Tennessee, the Courts, on petition of the owner, and for sufficient reasons therein set forth, may emancipate a slave! (Tenn. Laws; Act of 1801, chap. 27.)

     “Emancipation is guarded in Tennessee by a provision (statute of 1777) that the State must assent, or the act of manumission by deed or will is ineffectual; and (as appears in Fisher vs. Dabbs, 6 Yerger’s Rep., 119,) the emancipated slave must be immediately removed beyond the limits of the United States.” (Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, p. 387.)

     “By statute of Alabama, Aikin’s Dig., 647, slaves may be emancipated by the master, on application to the County Court, and on proof of meritorious services, but the slave must remove out of the limits of the State.” (Ib.)

     Mississippi has combined all the obstacles in the laws of all the other States. (Shroud, p. 149.)

     Kentucky, Missouri. Virginia, and Maryland, afford greater facilities for emancipation. (Ib.) In Kentucky and Missouri the master may emancipate, “saving the rights of creditors,” and by giving bonds for the maintenance of the aged and infirm.

     In Virginia the law is similar, only that if the emancipated slave be over twenty-one years of age, he must leave the State in one year, or be reënslaved! (Revised Code, 436.)

     Maryland has a proviso that the emancipated slave shall be “of healthy constitution,” &c., “capable of labor,” and “not exceeding forty-five years of age.” (Laws of 1796, chap. 67.)

     In Louisiana, “no one can emancipate his slave, unless the slave has attained the age of thirty years, and has behaved well for at least four years preceding his emancipation.” But “a slave who has saved

the life of his master, his master’s wife, or one of his children, may be emancipated at any age.” (Art. 185, 186.) Also, the child of a deceased slave mother who had acquired the right to freedom at a future time, becomes free at that time. (Art. 196.) And a slave entitled to a future release is capable of receiving property by testament or donation. (Art. 193.) For these remnants of justice and mercy, humanity is indebted, perhaps, to the former usages of the French and Spaniards, under the Code Noir.

     From the legislators we now turn to the judges and reporters of judicial decisions.

     “With respect to emancipation, it may be stated as a principle without an exception, that, as slaves are considered property upon which creditors have a right to look for the payment of their debts due by the owner of slaves, regard must be had to the rights of the creditor; and no act of emancipation is valid when these are violated.” (Note, in Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, p. 310.)

     So then the slave, by extraordinary exertions and by agreement with his master, may have obtained emancipation for himself and family, and may have removed with them to a free State. Yet the master’s creditor may take out an execution, and reënslave them, by the help of the Fugitive Slave Act of Congress. The money paid by the slave does not constitute him a creditor, in the eye of the law; for it belonged, in law, to the master, before it was paid to him!

     “Slaves manumitted by Will, where the personal

estate is not sufficient to pay the debts of the testator, are not entitled to freedom.” This is the marginal note to the case of Negro George et al. vs. Corse, Adm’r.; June T., 1827. (2 Harris and Gill’s Md. Rep., 1.)

     The Will of James Corse, manumitting the slaves, contained the following: “And it is hereby provided that if my personal estate, EXCLUSIVE OF NEGROES, should not be sufficient to discharge all my just debts, then my will is that my executor or administrator, as the case may be, may sell so much of my real estate as will, pay my debts, so as to have my negroes free, as before stated.”

     “It was admitted that the personal estate of the testator, either including or excluding the negroes, was not, at the time of his death, or at any time since, sufficient to pay his debts; but that his real estate, including his personal property, and excluding the negroes, were, at the time of his death, and still are, sufficient to pay his debts. Verdict for defendants, and petitioners appealed. After argument, the Court, Dorsey, Archer, and Earl, Judges, affirmed the judgment, and that the creditors had a right to their demands out of the personal estate.” (Wheeler, pp. 327-8.)

     Thus the Court annulled the express provisions of the Will, whether with or without authority from the statute, does not appear. And the principle established would, in the same manner, set aside a similar Will of a testator who might leave millions in real estate, if his personal estate, exclusive of

negroes, should fall short of paying his debts. The object and spirit of such decisions cannot be hid. The rights of the free as well as of the enslaved are outrageously infringed by such proceedings, in which the death-bed promptings of conscience, repentance, justice, and mercy, are profanely spurned and trampled in the dust.

     “Slaves are subject to dower in all the States. Not only are they subject to dower, but the widow’s interest in them is protected by statutory provisions. If the husband manumits his slaves, whereby creditors and the dower of the widow are affected, the manumission is so far ineffectual that the manumitted slaves may be sold for a period, and the proceeds of the sale applied to the creditors of the former owner and his widow.” [Numerous authorities cited.] (Wheeler, note to p. 181.)

     In other circumstances the courts are less regardful of the rights of woman.

     “A wife’s estate in dower of slaves, by a former husband, on her second marriage, rests in her husband.” “And her right to manumit them is gone.” (Wheeler, p. 182.)

     On the subject of the validity of contracts and promises of masters to manumit, there seems some slight diversity among the judges, as will be seen from the following, in which the general doctrine is apparent:

     “A written agreement by a master with his slave to manumit him is obligatory; it rests in benevolence, not in contract.” (Marginal Note.) The Judge said:

“The manumission of a slave does not rest upon the principle of a contract, depending upon a consideration; but it is an act of benevolence sanctioned by the statute, and made obligatory, if in writing.” (Kettletas vs. Fleet, Feb. T.) 1811; 7 John’s New-York Rep., 324. Wheeler, p. 232.)

     “Chancery cannot enforce a contract between master and slave, though the slave perform his part.” (Stevenson vs. Singleton, Feb. T., 1829; 1 Leigh’s Va. Rep., 72. Wheeler, p. 233.)

     Same decision in Sawney vs. Carter, March Term, 1828; 6 Randolph’s Va. Rep., 173. Wheeler, p. 237. Cited in Leigh’s Rep. I. 72, Virg., 1829, as follows:

     “Application to enforce a contract between master and slave.—Per Cur.: In the case of Sawney vs. Carter, the Court refused, on great consideration, to enforce a promise by a master to emancipate his slave where the conditions of the promise had been partly complied with by the slave. The Court proceeded on the principle that it is not competent to a Court of Chancery to enforce a contract between master and slave, even although the contract should be fully complied with on the part of the slave.”

     Fugitive slaves, on arriving at the North, have sometimes exhibited the written agreements of their masters to emancipate them, on condition of their payment of a certain specified amount of money, payable in instalments. Along with these, they have exhibited the receipts of their masters for the several instalments in full. And yet they have been compelled to run away to obtain their hard-earned freedom,

with all the hazards of being hunted and recaptured! The writer has seen and examined such documents.

     “If an informal emancipation takes place, the master promising to comply with the legal formalities, his rights are not thereby affected before the formalities be observed.” (Bazzy vs. Rose and child, May T., 1820; 8 Martin’s Louisiana Rep., 149. Wheeler, p. 307.) In this case, the promise, in writing, was produced. On a habeas corpus, the slaves (Rose and child) had been discharged, as free persons. But the claimant, Bazzi, brought this suit against them, and the Court, Martin, J., decreed them to be slaves of the plaintiff!

     “A contract to manumit is obligatory.” (Case of Negro Tom, Feb. T.,1810; 5 John’s New-York Rep., 363. Wheeler, p. 309.)

     “No declaration or promise made to a slave can be enforced in a Court of law.” (Marginal note.)

     Beall vs. Joseph. Trespass to try Joseph’s right to freedom. He had been a slave to one Woods, who agreed to let Edwards have him for four years, after which he was to be free. Both Woods and Edwards made parol declarations to this effect. But Edwards sold him a slave to Beall. The Judge said, “It is clear that no declaration or promise made to the slave in this State, (Kentucky,) or for his benefit, by the owner or any other person, can be enforced in a Court of law or equity. And see Will vs. Thompson, in a note at the end of the case, where it was held, that where a PURCHASER in writing

contracted with the SELLER to manumit the slave at a specified brie, it is not a ground for a suit at common law, but equity will enforce the contract, and give DAMAGES for the detention of the negro.” (Harden’s Ky. Rep., 51. Wheeler, p. 331.)

     A contrary decision appears in Negro Cato vs. Howard. (June T., 1808; 2 Har. and John’s Md. Rep., 323. Wheeler, p. 323.)

     “Parol evidence of an agreement for the freedom of a slave is inadmissible.” (Victoire vs. Dussuau, March T., 1816; 4 Martin’s Louisiana Rep., 212. Wheeler, p. 334.)

     “An infant cannot be emancipated,” “nor can a slave be set free who is not both under the age of forty-five years, and able to work, and gain a sufficient maintenance and livelihood, at the time the freedom is intended to commence.” (Hamilton vs. Cragg, June T., 1823; 6 Har. and John’s Md. Rep., 16. Also Hall vs. Mullin, 5 Har. and John’s Md. Rep., 190. Wheeler, p. 311.)

     “A bequest of liberty to slaves, in contravention of the law, is void.” (Mary vs. Morris et al., Aug. T.) 1834; 7 Lou. Rep., 135. Wheeler, p. 311.)

     “A deed of emancipation not recorded in the proper court, but in some other, gives no title to freedom until properly recorded.” (Sawney vs. Carter, [before cited.] Also Givens vs. Mann, 6 Munf. Va. Rep., 191. Also Lewis vs. Fullerton, 1 Randolph’s Va. Rep., 15. Wheeler, p. 238.)

     “Whether a slave, who is directed to be set free by the last will and testament of his master, can

have the intervention of a magistrate to prevent his removal out of the State, quere.” (Marginal note to Moosa vs. Allain, 16 Martin’s Lou. Rep., 99. Wheeler, p. 317.) The testator, Julien Poydras, directed in his will, that his slaves on his several plantations should each be considered inseparable from the respective plantation on which they were, and that they should, at the end of twenty-five years, be free. The plaintiff was however sold, and taken to another plantation, against his will and consent, and, as he believed, with an intention of carrying him out of the State. He petitioned for a recession of the sale, and to be restored to the plantation where he belonged. There was judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. Judgment affirmed!

     “A slave cannot be emancipated by a nuncupative [verbal, declaratory] will, nor by an executory or conditional instrument in writing.” (Cooke [colored] vs. Cooke; 3 Littell’s Ky. Rep., 236. Wheeler, p. 328.)

     Besides these legislative obstructions to emancipation by the masters, there are, in several of the States, constitutional provisions restraining the State Legislatures from abolishing slavery by statute. As the State will not intrust the planters with the power of manumission, so neither will the planters allow the State to hold the power of abolition.

     The laws forbidding or obstructing emancipation have been pleaded on behalf of the slaveholders, as an excuse for not emancipating their slaves. But

they can be of no avail, except to such as oppose those laws. Slaveholders, moreover, might give their slaves “a pass” to the borders of the free States, or accompany them thither. The fact that others will reënslave those whom they may emancipate cannot excuse them. They have no right to continue a wicked practice, because others would take it up if they relinquished it!

     Concerning the law of Virginia reënslaving the emancipated negro, the Powhatan Colonization Society (addressing the Virginia Legislature) said “The law was doubtless dictated by sound policy, and its repeal would be regarded by none with more unfeigned regret than by the friends of African colonization. It has restrained many masters from giving freedom to their slaves, and has thereby contributed to check the growth of an already TOO GREAT AND GROWING EVIL!(Jay’s Inquiry, p. 108.)

     It ill befits those who hold and who patronize this language, to cite the laws impeding emancipation, to justify slaveholders in refusing to emancipate! But this incongruity is constantly witnessed! The popularity, at the South and at the North, of those Societies and statesmen and ministers of religion who hold such language and occupy such a position, may assist to throw light on the inquiry, whether, in this particular, the people are better than their laws.

     And let it be remembered that, in the judgment of those who ought to know, and who are directly interested in the matter, it is only by such laws that

“the innocent legal relation” of slave ownership can be sustained.

     In Weld’s “Slavery as it is,” p. 164, may be found the particulars of the reënslavement of one hundred and thirty-four slaves in North Carolina, who had been liberated by the Quakers in 1776. The old law of 1741 could not prevent it. In 1777, after the manumissions had taken place, a new law was made prohibiting such procedure, and the County Courts, under this Act, ordered the emancipated slaves to be sold into slavery! The Superior Court, in 1778, reversed the decision, and the negroes were, a second time, set at liberty. But the Legislature, in 1779, confirmed the title of the purchasers by a special Act, and they were taken up, and a second time reduced to slavery! A fair illustration of the legality of the “peculiar relation!”

     Such are the relations of the slave to civil government and to society; such the protection he receives from them.